Former U.S. Secretary of the Interior David L. Bernhardt shares an intriguing secret about his experience serving as an acting secretary under President Donald Trump. In his new book, “You Report to Me: Accountability for the Failing Administrative State,” Bernhardt reveals how he had direct access to the president, bypassing the usual bureaucratic hurdles that cabinet secretaries face. This direct access allowed him to avoid periods of inactivity and ensured that those serving in the executive branch reported directly to the president, as the Constitution mandates.
Bernhardt’s experience highlights the importance of access to the president and challenges the prevailing assumption that the White House Office and the Office of Management and Budget run the modern presidency. He argues that the government today does not function as the Constitution intended, with Congress delegating policymaking to the bureaucracy and careerist officials performing key executive functions without being held accountable.
One of the main issues Bernhardt identifies is the growth of government, which has made managing it more challenging over time. He expresses frustration with the cumbersome procedures for removing poor-performing employees and the ways in which dysfunctional employees can hinder progress. He emphasizes the need for accountability and suggests reforms such as reining in unions and implementing at-will employment to restore the original vision for merit service.
Bernhardt also criticizes the dominance of unelected bureaucrats in policymaking and enforcement, which often leads to errors and bias. He argues for greater oversight by political appointees and emphasizes the importance of political leadership in decision-making. He warns political appointees to familiarize themselves with the relevant laws and regulations and advises them to be cautious about what they say or write, as it can be used against them.
While Bernhardt acknowledges the competence of many civil servants, he believes that there is a need to address the lack of compliance with the law and agency policies. He calls for a system where enforcement actions require the authorization of a principal officer and highlights the conflict of interest in adjudication processes conducted by executive-branch administrative judges.
In conclusion, Bernhardt’s book sheds light on the necessity of political control over the bureaucracy and the need for direct accountability to the elected president. He offers insights into the challenges faced by political appointees and calls for reforms to restore the proper functioning of the executive branch.
